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Girl Syllabus

A starting guide to language, gender, and power online

Ellen Yang's avatar
Ellen Yang
Nov 18

I was surprised to see the first article I ever posted on Substack blowing up. It is now at over 8,000 likes and a thousand restacks, most of which happened in the last two weeks.

It’s more than two years old, written between my junior and senior years of college. I am so grateful to everyone who has discovered this article and who has shared it on the platform or elsewhere. I double majored in English and linguistics, and as I’ve written in my newly updated About page, I desperately miss school. I haven’t written on Substack in a long time because I am now working full-time supporting other writers. Coincidentally, I still spend a lot of time on the platform, but mostly on other writers’ dashboards. It is my dream job!

It is extremely easy to write when you are learning new things all the time. You can take your class notes and spend time reflecting on them. Actually, most of my Substacks began as articles I would start writing in lecture, because that was how I processed my ideas. I love to write, and I had so many opportunities to do it in college. I wrote for my college paper; I wrote a 50,000-word novel in ENGLISH 190E (Novel Writing Intensive, a bucket list course for so many at Stanford); I wrote a 121-page honors thesis. I became very immune to word counts and have been known to describe writing to my clients as “the physical activity of thinking,” because, at this point, at least for me, writing is just fingers on the keyboard, typing, typing, typing. I wrote a lot of garbage in college; I wrote a lot of pretentious garbage in college; I wrote a lot of questions and my attempted answers (usually also garbage). Thank god for professors!

What I loved most about my linguistics courses was applying what I learned to the real world and my own life, which is not always the obvious application of academia. I chose linguistics because its subject was already happening all around me: people talking, making choices, understanding and misunderstanding one another. I love fiction and studied English for the experiments and reflections, but I also wanted to study language as people were living it. I am really interested in social media, the digital world, and the various new architectures we build online, whether through artificial intelligence, crypto/Web3, or the creator economy and an increasingly creator-led world. We are so influenced by digital media because we are so influenced by other humans, and so much of that influence happens through language. Language is complex, inventive, and sometimes deliberate, although we aren’t always conscious of the social meanings our choices carry. Why do we choose one word over another? What do we expect someone else to understand about us when we use it? Why do we care?

I’ve been so overwhelmed by the new activity on my Substack that I actually have not done anything at all. I haven’t replied to any comments (which is something I tell clients to do ALWAYS. Always, always reply! We should never take someone else’s interaction with our work for granted), and I haven’t written anything new. However, one comment really stood out to me the other day, and I finally opened a note to start writing.

I logged back into Canvas and opened my old assignments (forget the novel class—most linguistics classes required a short reading response a week, so 500 words per class x at least 3 classes a quarter x 10 weeks x 2 or so years = typing, typing, typing) to remind myself of what I’d actually read and learned, with the goal of putting together a list of suggested readings and key ideas to expand on my initial article. This is essentially an annotated bibliography, which I actually despised doing in college, because wasn’t an annotated bibliography just the research and thinking we were already doing, now painstakingly (and maybe excessively) formalized into something we had to turn in? I hated how formulaic teaching writing could be. But in this case, the bibliography is coming after the post, and the questions are still accumulating.

Assumption of the Virgin Mary by Guido Reni

In my original essay, I wrote about the tension between reclamation and regression in “girl” language: the possibility that we can be in on the joke and still participate in the stereotypes that make it recognizable. Here, I want to spend more time with the ideas behind that argument. How does language become associated with gender in the first place? What are we doing when we use it, and how much control do we have over what other people hear (or read, especially in the context of social media)?

Sociolinguistics studies language in its social context, including how ways of speaking vary and acquire meaning. It gives us a way to examine the tiny choices we make every day alongside the much larger structures we live within. The readings below come from sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology, feminist theory, and related fields. Most were not written about TikTok or any social media platform. The connections to “girl” culture are my applications of their ideas, and invitations to think through them with me.

One practical and pesky note before we get into the readings: several of the original papers and book chapters are behind academic paywalls. I encountered much of this work through my classes, where access to a university library (or a class media folder) made it easier to forget how difficult it can be to find the same material elsewhere. These are ideas about things we do every day, and I don’t think you should need a university login to think about them. The humanities should be freely and publicly available to all.

I’ve linked free full texts where I could verify them and added public essays, interviews, videos, and short research summaries alongside the academic readings. Some are introductions by the scholars themselves; others engage with related questions. I’ve noted when a link is a prepublication version or an abstract, because those are useful, but they aren’t the same as the final paper. You can begin with whichever format interests you. There is no assigned reading, and I will not be checking your annotations.

This also should go without saying, but I am not a linguist. I only know what I learned in my undergraduate years, so there is a very good chance that there are real, working academics who disagree with me, and that much of my analysis is still rudimentary. However, my goal is to create opportunities for more people to engage with these ideas, which is why I post on Substack at all.

1. There is no single way to sound like a woman

Before we talk about “female language,” we have to ask what we think that category contains.

In “The Whole Woman,” Penelope Eckert examines linguistic variation among adolescents in a Detroit-area high school. Gender matters, but it matters through the social lives people are actually living: their relationships, their orientations toward school, and their participation in groups such as the “jocks” and “burnouts.” Differences among girls are part of the explanation, rather than inconvenient exceptions to whatever girls supposedly do.

That distinction is easy to lose online, where “women are doing this” becomes a way of describing something a particular group of women is doing, in a particular place, for a particular audience.

Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet develop this approach in “Think Practically and Look Locally.” They ask us to study language and gender through everyday practices in specific communities. A community of practice involves people engaged together in an ongoing endeavor, through which shared ways of doing things, talking, and evaluating one another develop. An editorial team might be one. So might a group of friends whose relationships are organized around making and sharing particular kinds of content. An entire gender is not automatically one community of practice, and neither is everyone who has encountered the same hashtag.

This makes the questions about “girl math” more varied. Which people are using it? Are they making fun of themselves, teasing a friend, selling something, or criticizing the joke? What counts as funny within their relationships? And what happens when someone else encounters the phrase without knowing those relationships exist?

On the syllabus: Eckert’s “The Whole Woman: Sex and Gender Differences in Variation” (free full-text PDF) complicates broad claims about women’s speech. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet’s “Think Practically and Look Locally” (free full-text PDF) explains why the practices and power relations of particular communities matter.

Start here for free: In “Language and Gender: Mainstreaming and the Persistence of Patriarchy”, Deborah Cameron gives a public-facing account of the field’s feminist beginnings and continuing political stakes. Eckert’s short “Communities of Practice, Style and Personae” overview explains the community-based approach in her own words.

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2. The good woman is apparently not very funny

One of the readings that gave me pause as a sophomore or junior was Eckert’s “The Good Woman,” a commentary on Robin Lakoff’s work on language and gender. Eckert describes a recognizable ideal of womanhood: refined, agreeable, attentive to other people, and careful about how she presents herself. This is a specifically white, middle-class feminine ideal, although its influence extends beyond the women who resemble it.

It is also an ideal with very little room for being ridiculous.

Drawing on her fieldwork with children, Eckert describes boys gaining social standing through antics that would get girls dismissed as immature. Girls learn that certain kinds of silliness are unavailable to them, or available at a cost. Her account is situated in particular communities and an earlier moment, but the question it raises feels very alive: who gets to be funny without that becoming evidence against their competence?

Scott Kiesling approaches a related question through masculine ease. His work examines how certain low-investment stances, displays of unconcern or comfort, contribute to a dominant form of white, cisgender, heterosexual American masculinity. Apparent ease can help produce authority. The speaker does not seem to need to work very hard to establish his right to be there.

Reading these together makes me wonder about the appeal of being “just a girl.” Perhaps part of the pleasure is permission to stop being the perfect woman for a moment: the competent professional, the responsible consumer, the person who has anticipated everyone else’s needs before her own.

That possibility can coexist with my concern about the joke. What happens when the language we use to make room for female silliness makes female incompetence its premise? How much freedom does that give us, and how much does it depend on other people understanding the distinction?

I don’t think the answer is to demand that women become more serious. That expectation alone is already doing plenty of work!

On the syllabus: Eckert’s “The Good Woman” examines an ideal against which women are evaluated. Kiesling’s “Masculine Stances and the Linguistics of Affect: On Masculine Ease” (free full-text PDF), which I discussed in a class essay, offers a way to think about the social power of seeming unbothered.

Start here for free: Cameron’s “Immodesty Becomes Her?” looks at the backlash against women claiming expertise and the expectation that a “good” woman should be modest. It is a companion to Eckert’s chapter, rather than a summary of it. Kiesling’s paper is linked above as a free full text.

3. A word can mean more than what it says

One of the most useful concepts here is indexicality: the way language points toward social meanings beyond what it literally says.

A person can describe a purchase without calling it “girl math.” Adding the phrase can invite an interpretation of the speaker as playful, indulgent, or familiar with a particular online conversation. It might be interpreted as self-awareness or “being influenced.” In any case, the phrase signals something about the relationship between the speaker, the purchase, and whoever is listening.

But those possibilities are not fixed. In “Variation and the Indexical Field,” Eckert describes linguistic features as having a range of related potential meanings, activated and reshaped in context. Her focus is sociolinguistic variation; I find the framework useful for thinking about the shifting social associations of “girl” language as well.

Imagine “girl math” in three settings: a private conversation where friends knowingly joke about justifying a purchase; a credit card advertisement that borrows the same playful attitude toward spending without using the phrase; and a hostile post claiming that women cannot manage money. Each draws on a familiar association between women and financial irresponsibility, but puts it to a different use. Among friends, it can create solidarity through shared self-mockery. In an advertisement, it can make spending feel appealing. In the hostile post, it becomes an accusation. The association is similar; what people are doing with it changes.

Hailey Bieber Fronts Chase Sapphire Reserve's New Fashion Campaign —  Because of Marketing®

This is also where I want to be more precise about the “nonsense” in my first essay. Linguistic play can be socially meaningful even when its literal meaning is strange or difficult to paraphrase. A catchy phrase can communicate familiarity, affiliation, desire, or a particular attitude very efficiently. In this way, calling it nonsense was meant to open a conversation about what people are accomplishing by repeating it.

The possibility of several meanings is what makes a phrase available for play, but it is also what makes its circulation unpredictable. We can emphasize one association without making the others disappear. A joke about being bad with money may create shared amusement between friends while sounding like confirmation to someone who already thinks women really are bad with money.

Being aware of a stereotype gives us ways to work with it, but no one possesses exclusive rights to its interpretation.

On the syllabus: Eckert’s “Variation and the Indexical Field” (free full-text PDF) is the central reading for understanding how social meanings remain connected, flexible, and open to change.

Start here for free: Cameron’s “There Go the Girls” is particularly relevant to this entire essay. She examines how “girl” can communicate hierarchy, intimacy, solidarity, or more troubling expectations about women. Her argument against a blanket prohibition makes a useful counterpoint to my original piece. For the theoretical framework itself, Eckert’s full paper is freely available above.

4. A joke is also a way of finding your people

When someone responds to “girl math” with “exactly” or its variations (like “period”), they may be doing more than agreeing.

John W. Du Bois’s stance triangle describes how, in taking a stance, we evaluate something, position ourselves in relation to it, and align with other people. Even a tiny reaction can accomplish all three.

Imagine someone joking that returning a dress means she has made money. Her friend replies, “A financial genius.” The exchange evaluates the return, positions both speakers as aware of the absurdity, and creates a moment of shared understanding. A third person who earnestly explains that a refund is not income might be entirely correct and still miss what the interaction is doing.

This helps explain why “girl” language can be appealing even to people who have complicated feelings about its premise. The pleasure may lie in finding someone who recognizes the same little contradictions you do, so in this case, the joke lets you identify each other.

Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall’s account of identity and interaction takes this further. Identity emerges through social interaction, including the similarities, differences, and claims to legitimacy we establish with other people. Some of this is deliberate, some habitual, and some imposed through other people’s interpretations.

A shared joke can make us recognizable to each other, but it can also establish a condition of belonging. What happens if being “one of the girls” starts to require joking about shopping, beauty, or helplessness in a particular way? Who can participate comfortably, and who has to perform a version of herself that makes the group comfortable?

The same language that brings people together can make the boundaries of that togetherness more difficult to cross.

On the syllabus: Du Bois’s “The Stance Triangle” explains evaluation, positioning, and alignment. Bucholtz and Hall’s “Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach” (free full-text PDF) connects these local interactions to the construction of social identities.

Start here for free: Kiesling’s “Stance and Stance-Taking” gives a brief introduction to the relationships we create with other people, our subjects, and our own words. It is a useful first step before Du Bois’s more technical chapter. Bucholtz and Hall’s paper is linked above as a free university-repository PDF.

5. Gender is something we keep doing

Judith Butler’s theory of performativity is frequently shortened to “gender is a performance,” which can sound as if gender were an outfit we consciously select every morning.

The argument is more complicated. Repeated acts, gestures, and ways of presenting ourselves help constitute the gendered identities they appear simply to express. These repetitions take place within social expectations, and there are consequences for getting them “wrong.” We learn what is recognizable as feminine or masculine, and that recognizability can begin to look like evidence that the categories were natural and self-explanatory all along.

I’m interested in how “girl” trends make certain repetitions conspicuous. Spending becomes girl spending; eating becomes girl eating. We can see a process of categorization happening. Ordinary activities are assembled into a recognizable account of femininity, which other people can repeat, modify, or reject.

Butler’s discussion of drag is useful because it examines how repetition and parody can expose the constructed character of gender. That possibility does not make every exaggerated gender performance automatically liberating. Its effects depend on how it works in a particular setting.

J. Calder gives this discussion an empirical grounding through research with drag queens in San Francisco’s South of Market neighborhood. Across “The Fierceness of Fronted /s/” and “From Sissy to Sickening,” Calder examines how speech, visual presentation, and local understandings of femininity work together. A way of pronouncing /s/ can acquire different meanings depending on the body and persona through which listeners encounter it.

In the manuscript “Prosthetics,” Calder also considers wigs, makeup, and shaping garments as semiotic prosthetics: materials that help enable socially recognizable forms of self-presentation and action.

This makes me think about how rarely we actually encounter language online by itself. We encounter a voice alongside a face, an outfit, a room, a caption, a camera angle. Applying Calder’s work to these settings, I would ask how those elements make particular meanings available. What allows an exaggerated feminine persona to be understood as knowing, funny, or powerful? When does the audience instead hear confirmation of what it already believes?

The words are part of the performance. So are the conditions under which we get to hear them.

On the syllabus: Butler’s “Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions,” in Gender Trouble, provides the theoretical foundation. Calder’s “The Fierceness of Fronted /s/”, “From Sissy to Sickening” (free prepublication PDF), and “Prosthetics” (course manuscript; no public copy verified) examine the relationship between bodies, language, material presentation, and the possibilities of gendered action.

Watch or listen for free: Butler explains the distinction between “performed” and “performative” in “Your Behavior Creates Your Gender,” a short Big Think interview on YouTube. For a related conversation about voices, visual presentation, and gender, listen to Lingthusiasm’s interview with sociolinguist Jacq Jones, which also has a free transcript. This is a discussion of Jones’s research, not a presentation of Calder’s studies.

6. The audience already thinks they know who you are

We often talk about language as if the speaker sends a meaning and the listener receives it. Sociolinguistic perception research makes that picture much less comfortable.

Annette D’Onofrio’s “Complicating Categories” examines how different visual presentations of the same Korean individual influence American listeners’ expectations about speech. Those presentations evoke different personae, recognizable social types that carry assumptions about someone’s background and behavior. In a speech-recall experiment, the photographs also corresponded to differences in how accurately listeners remembered what they heard.

That is a more specific finding than simply saying that people judge accents by appearance. The study shows why even a broad racial category can be inadequate for explaining listeners’ expectations. Different ways of presenting a person within that category matter.

A persona is not necessarily a fake identity. It is a socially recognizable configuration of characteristics. Online, we constantly encounter and construct them: the polished professional, the chaotic best friend, the girl who somehow makes every inconvenience look romantic.

Applying this research to “girl” culture, I wonder how much of a joke’s reception has begun before the words arrive. The same claim to incompetence might sound endearing from one person and disqualifying from another. To examine that possibility, we would have to look at the specific speakers, audiences, and expectations involved.

It is tempting to tell women that the solution is to communicate more clearly. But clarity alone cannot settle an interpretation that also depends on who the listener believes is speaking.

On the syllabus: D’Onofrio’s “Complicating Categories: Personae Mediate Racialized Expectations of Non-native Speech” gives a concrete example of how visual social information shapes linguistic expectations and processing.

Start here for free: Cameron’s “Fundy Baby Voice-Shaming” offers a related public discussion of how social judgments shape commentary about women’s voices. For D’Onofrio’s own project, there is a free one-page conference abstract. That abstract predates the 2019 article and is not the full paper.

7. Whose girlhood are we talking about?

The “girl” in these conversations can begin to look universal precisely because we have stopped describing her.

Does she have money to spend? Does she have the freedom to treat financial dependence as a joke? Is she presumed innocent when she makes a mistake? What kind of body do people imagine when they hear her voice? Which parts of her identity become visible, and which are allowed to remain unremarkable?

Kimberlé Crenshaw’s account of intersectionality begins with a much more consequential problem than internet language: the inability of legal and political frameworks organized separately around race or sex to adequately account for discrimination against Black women. Her critique demonstrates how a framework can erase the very people it claims to include when it treats the experiences of relatively privileged members as representative of an entire group.

That argument gives us a necessary question for feminist cultural criticism: who disappears when we say “women”?

In Doing Race, Hazel Rose Markus and Paula M. L. Moya likewise direct attention to how race is produced through everyday actions, ideas, and institutions. Calling a category socially constructed does not make its consequences imaginary; it asks us to examine the processes through which those consequences become organized and repeated.

Elaine Chun and Keith Walters bring an intersectional approach directly into the analysis of language, race, and sexuality. Their study of conversations among Korean American girls examines how the girls contest the devaluation of their bodies while also drawing on racialized standards of desirability. Language allows them to challenge an evaluation without entirely escaping the system through which bodies are evaluated.

As it pertains to my original article, I feel strongly that recognizing a hierarchy does not automatically place us outside it. Could I be contributing to the patriarchy, even now? I’m not sure. We can be highly perceptive about an unfair standard while still using its terms to establish our own worth.

For “girl” culture, this means asking whose femininity is being made desirable, whose vulnerability is being made cute, and who is allowed to treat the entire thing as a game.

On the syllabus: Crenshaw’s “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” establishes the foundational critique. Markus and Moya’s edited collection Doing Race, discussed in my class essay, examines everyday racial construction. Chun and Walters’s “At the Crossroads of Language, Race, and Sexuality” demonstrates why these dimensions need to be examined together.

Watch for free: Crenshaw explains intersectionality in her TED talk “The Urgency of Intersectionality”. Stanford’s RaceWorks video collection includes “Doing Race” and “Racial Perception,” with scholars including Markus and Moya. These films offer an accessible companion to the book; Crenshaw’s original article is also publicly downloadable from the university repository linked above.

8. Being in on the joke does not resolve what the joke does

This is probably the question most directly connected to my first essay. If women are using these terms knowingly, if we understand the stereotype and are deliberately exaggerating it, shouldn’t that change the meaning?

It can. The difficulty is that it does not necessarily resolve the meaning.

In “Ideologies of Legitimate Mockery,” Chun examines Margaret Cho’s use of “Mock Asian,” racialized representations of Asian speech, within her comedy. Cho’s identity and her relationship to her audience help establish how those performances are understood. A performance can expose and criticize a racial stereotype while continuing to depend on recognizable associations between race and language.

The analysis resists an easy verdict of either pure subversion or straightforward reproduction, which is why I wanted to include it here. The critical frame matters, and so does the material being placed within it.

Heather Burnett approaches a related problem in “A Persona-Based Semantics for Slurs.” Examining “dyke” and “lesbian,” she considers the different personae these terms can evoke and how listeners reason about a speaker’s attitudes. In her account, a listener’s understanding of the speaker’s ideological position helps explain why some uses can be interpreted as reclaimed.

These words have histories and harms very different from “girl.” The useful connection concerns how an interpretation depends on more than a speaker’s privately intended meaning. Sharing an identity does not ensure that everyone shares the same evaluation of a term, or the same understanding of its use.

Now imagine the audience changing: the joke leaves a familiar group, appears in someone else’s feed, and eventually becomes advertising copy. The shared understanding that supported one interpretation may not travel with it. In this way, what was intimate can become generic; what was self-directed can become a claim about women in general.

We cannot understand this by asking only, “Did she mean it ironically?” We also have to ask what an audience recognizes, what it laughs at, and what assumptions remain available afterward.

On the syllabus: Chun’s “Ideologies of Legitimate Mockery: Margaret Cho’s Revoicings of Mock Asian” (open-access article; PDF download on page) examines how critical humor can reproduce and contest ideology simultaneously. Burnett’s “A Persona-Based Semantics for Slurs” offers a more formal account of personae, ideological expectations, and reclamation.

Read for free: Chun’s article is available under an open-access license through the publisher; use the PDF download on its page. For a shorter introduction to Burnett’s proposal, read her public talk abstract. It outlines the argument about personae and listeners’ ideological expectations, but it is an abstract, not the full 2020 article.

9. What are we allowed to want?

There is another question beneath all this identity work: what desires are being expressed, concealed, or made acceptable?

In Language and Sexuality, Deborah Cameron and Don Kulick argue for attention to desire alongside, and beyond, the study of sexual identity. Their subject includes erotic desire, fantasy, pleasure, repression, and the ways these become communicable through social conventions. Desire can feel intensely private while drawing on shared forms of expression. It is not always wholly conscious, and what someone can say about it is shaped by what can be recognized.

Bucholtz and Hall push back against an approach that would sideline identity in favor of desire. They argue that identity and desire are intertwined, and that analyses need to retain their attention to power. The disagreement matters. These readings are in conversation; they do not offer one seamless theory.

I find that conversation useful for thinking about the relationship between wanting something and being a particular kind of girl. My extension here concerns everyday wants, rather than a claim that the authors’ analysis of erotic desire directly explains shopping memes.

What becomes easier to admit when it is packaged as “girl math”? Wanting a beautiful thing? Wanting pleasure without a lengthy defense of its usefulness? Wanting someone else to recognize the pleasure and say, yes, I understand?

And what about “girl dinner”? In one setting, the phrase could make it easier to admit exhaustion or a desire for a meal that meets only your own preferences. In another, it could make a restrictive ideal look charming. The label alone cannot tell us which interaction we are looking at.

I want to know what the joke permits someone to say, and why saying it more plainly might feel difficult. There is something worth examining when an ordinary desire becomes more socially comfortable after we have made ourselves a little ridiculous for having it.

On the syllabus: Cameron and Kulick’s “Looking Beyond Identity: Language and Desire” broadens the questions we can ask about sexuality and language. Bucholtz and Hall’s “Theorizing Identity in Language and Sexuality Research” (free full-text PDF) challenges the separation of desire from identity and power.

Start here for free: Cameron’s “Asking for It: Language and Affirmative Consent” is a public essay about desire, communication, and the assumptions audiences bring to language. It engages with related questions rather than reproducing the textbook chapter. The full Bucholtz and Hall response is freely available through the university-repository link above.

10. We can act without controlling every consequence

Finally, agency, a word that can become so abstract that it stops being useful.

Laura Ahearn defines agency as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act.” That definition asks us to consider both our ability to do things and the social conditions that make particular actions possible. Agency does not require complete independence from the world around us. It also does not mean that every action we choose is resistant or emancipatory.

A woman can choose to participate in a trend, enjoy it, understand its contradictions, and contribute to effects she did not intend. Treating her as simply duped would miss her participation and insight. Treating the existence of a choice as proof of empowerment would miss the conditions and consequences of that choice.

This is where I return to commercialization. When a brand adopts a joke that women have been telling one another, I want to ask what changes: who is speaking, what is being offered, who profits, and what version of femininity is being made recognizable enough to sell it all. The framework helps us investigate those changes; it does not establish in advance that every commercial use has the same effect.

Nor does the possibility of commercial appropriation cancel the pleasure or connection people found in the joke. The point is to follow what happens to that pleasure as its context changes.

The tension between reclamation and regression remains worth examining because people are doing things with this language. They are finding friends, relieving embarrassment, expressing frustration, asserting desires, selling products, and making judgments about one another. Sometimes several of these things are happening in the same post.

On the syllabus: Ahearn’s “Language and Agency” (free full-text PDF) explains why agency cannot be reduced to either unrestricted choice or resistance. Read it alongside Bucholtz and Hall’s account of identity as partly intentional, partly habitual, and partly produced through other people’s interpretations.

Read for free: The link above opens the full text of Ahearn’s article, rather than the subscription page. For another route into the question of how actions are shaped by relationships and social expectations, return to the free full text of Bucholtz and Hall’s “Identity and Interaction”, especially the section on the “partialness principle.”

I still think there is something troubling about how easily female unseriousness becomes marketable. I also think a feminist analysis has to make room for women to be funny, tired, indulgent, contradictory, abrasive, and occasionally uninterested in explaining themselves. I don’t want every joke to become another assignment in being a good woman—but I do want us to be able to examine the joke without treating that examination as a failure to understand it.

What I loved about studying linguistics was how often it made something familiar become strange enough to discover new things. A tiny choice, a pronunciation, a label, an apparently obvious way of describing someone, could open onto a much larger set of questions about how we live together.

That is what I hope these readings offer. You can encounter a phrase you have heard a thousand times and begin asking: who is speaking, who is listening, what makes this meaningful?

I have missed having somewhere to put those questions. Thank you for giving me a reason to open my notes again.

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Grace
3h

so well researched and written as always<3

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em thampoe
8h

Loved reading this so much, Ellen!

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